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(hence the adoption of standards) are far more complex
than a simple dyad. This complexity is only amplified in
markets that have not adopted uniform industry wide
standards. Therefore, the questions that we shall address
henceforth are: what limitations do existing economic
models face in this context? What framework or
methodology is appropriate to address the limitation of
economic models? How can one understand firm behavior
using the proposed framework?

Abstract
Standards and compatibility issues play a significant
role in the software industry. Often, there are no uniform
industry wide standards in a standards immature market.
To overcome the lack of standards, firms in this market
aim to establish alliances. In this work, we adopt a new
research framework called network theory drawn from
sociology research to represent the complexity of this
market. This improves upon traditional microeconomic
perspectives by addressing indirect relationships and their
causal effects. We also introduce a concept called socio
technical capital as substitute measure for a firm’s clout
or position among other firms. Using this approach we
are able relate alliance formation by business application
software firms and compatibility issues. The results of an
ongoing study are presented to substantiate this approach.

In Section 2., we classify the software industry along
the dimension of the degree of maturity of standards. We
are particularly interested in the behavior of firms in a
standards “immature” market. The application software
industry is portrayed as an example of such a standards
“immature” industry and firm behavior in this
marketplace is analyzed. The discussion in Section 3 on
the complexity in this market helps to identify the
limitations of microeconomic models in addressing firm
behavior during standards adoption.
The unique
characteristics of modules that comprise the business
application software environment are further discussed.
In section 4.0, we propose a new approach drawn from
the field of social networks to represent inter-firm
relationships in this industry. A new construct called
“socio-technical capital” represents the relative influence
of a firm in the alliance network. We then study this
measure in comparison to a firm’s performance metrics.
Based on the results we argue that firms strike alliances to
improve their socio-technical capital and therefore their
performance.

Keywords: Standards, network analysis, ERP,
alliances

1. Introduction
Standards and their adoption by various producers
determine not only how compatible products and
components are with each other, but also influence many
other aspects, including consumer choices. When a
uniform standard (for a certain product/component) is
adopted throughout an industry, consumers benefit by
potentially having a wide variety of manufacturers to
choose from. For example, the adoption of VHS format
by all VCR manufacturers gives consumers a greater
variety of VCRs (Grindley, 1995). Standards potentially
assume a still greater significance in the software
industry, in view of a greater number of components that
perform a multitude of tasks and the need for these
products to seamlessly function with each other. Hence,
software firms face an increasing need to adopt/adapt
standards so as to ensure smooth inter-operability of
various components.

2. Maturity of standards in the software
industry
Standards are simply a set of rules or protocols that
act as guidelines. At a higher level of abstraction
standards is infrastructure, i.e., they "inscribe" behavior in
complex and non-transparent ways (Hanseth and
Monteiro, 1997; Monteiro, 2000). Standards could
involve rules at various levels, e.g., syntactic, semantic,
business protocols, communication protocols, etc. In
effect, a combination of these rules, determine how two
components interact to effectively support a task (Altman,
et al., July 1999). One can often observe that in some
industry structures, these rules are well established. We
classify such a market as standards mature, e.g., the
dominant standards created or proposed by Microsoft in

Typically microeconomic models have attempted to
explain the standards adoption behavior of firms. These
models have primarily focused on only dyadic
relationships. Concepts such as network externalities
have been used to explain potential benefits that firms
may derive by joining a network. We argue that
relationships between firms in the software industry
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value-adding, and by no means trivial components that
are often integrated with the core ones. Any single
vendor may offer most of them (e.g., SAP, BAAN, etc.)
or only a selected few functional areas (e.g., i2’s Supply
Chain Management (SCM) system, Siebel’s Customer
Relationship Management (CRM) software, etc.). In fact
integration costs incurred during ERP implementations
account for about 20-35% of the overall implementation
costs1. As a result we can find numerous third-party
consultants (integrators) and converter/adapter software in
the ERP market.

desktops operating systems (OS). Depending on the
process through which they are established, standards can
be termed either de facto or de jure (David, 1987; David
and Greenstein, 1990).
We define a standards immature industry as one
where there is a lack of uniform set of standards. This
could be attributed to i. the lack of a dominant leader or a
regulatory body or ii. in some cases the dynamic or
evolving nature of the industry (Metcalfe and Miles,
1994). Note that while there may be de facto or de jure
standards that might have emerged for specific parts of
these components, an overall standard for all multicomponent interactions may not be present (Altman, et
al., July 1999). In the application software industry,
efficient functioning of application software components
require standards to be established, both at the technology
and business protocol levels. While standard setting is
more difficult at the business protocol level (e.g.,
common process flows, nomenclature, etc.), even at the
technical protocol level (e.g., database schema, operating
system), uniformity of standards across components is
often found lacking. Even though some low-level
standards (e.g., RPC, DCOM, CORBA, etc.) adoption can
be observed in this industry, they do not necessarily
translate to higher-level functional integration (Altman, et
al., July 1999). All through this article we will refer to
this overall integration standards as compatibility.

The ERP industry has emerged in response to the
business community’s need to integrate its multiple
workflows. The history of the ERP industry dates back to
the days of Material Resource Planning (MRP) software,
i.e., manufacturing oriented approach was initially
adopted.
However, with new heterogeneous
requirements, the vendors often tightly integrated the
newer components to work best with their existing setup.
As there were no de facto business model templates, or
standardized process architectures, these components
simply took their own course of evolution. Today there
are numerous ERP vendors and many more
complementary software providers who did not
necessarily adopt a uniform set of specifications for
interfacing business and technical protocols. Since
consumer firms had to anyway invest in consultants for
their business protocol integration, technical integration
was not seen as a separate issue but rather simply was
absorbed into the overall implementation costs.

In a standards immature industry, some firms may
continue to adopt their own proprietary standards, while
most others, including new entrants, are likely to partner
with certain firms and adopt their standard. This adoption
process appears to be complex in standards immature
markets. While economic models may be able to predict
aggregate equilibrium outcome, we believe that it is
important to observe how the process actually unfolds.
Economic models are found lacking in this sense
(Hanseth, 1996). A new framework is necessary in order
to capture cumulative effects of firm relationships.

4. Economic models of standards and
compatibility
The issue of compatibility ala standards has been
discussed widely in economics literature (Economides,
1989; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Farrell and Saloner,
1992; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Matutes and Regibeau,
1988). The effects of compatibility on equilibrium
market structures and social/private incentives for firms,
to make their products compatible with other products,
have been modeled in the context of established
compatibility standards in technology industries (Farrell
and Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Their
findings suggest that in the presence of positive network
externalities, firms have an incentive to achieve complete
compatibility, i.e., to adhere to a uniform standard. While
these models had assumed the existence of standards in an
industry, subsequent economic models (Economides,
1989; Farrell and Saloner, 1992; Matutes and Regibeau,
1988), have addressed the same issues in the absence of
standards, as well. Some of these models have further
analyzed the tradeoff between a firm’s incentives to

We present a stylized view of the application
software industry as being representative of the
complexities mentioned above.

3. ERP – An example of a standards immature
industry
The Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software
industry can be broadly categorized into those firms that
supply certain core components as well as additional ones
and those that specialize in certain functional areas. The
anatomy of an enterprise system (Davenport, 1998)
consists of components serving distinct functionalities,
such as, sales and delivery, reporting, financial,
manufacturing, service, inventory and supply and human
resource management areas. Further there are significant

1

Components in the ERP World, K. Pond, R. Altman, GartnerGroup
Intraweb, Research Note Technology, 04 May 1999
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enable compatibility with rival products and the
disincentives to create such a standard (Economides,
1989; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Matutes and Regibeau,
1988). Some of this work (Economides, 1989; Matutes
and Regibeau, 1988) has also explored the heterogeneity
of products and their effect on incentives to achieve
compatibility. Further, these have also addressed markets
where there is an absence of any positive network
externality. However Economides (Economides, 1989) (p.
1180) also points out that "analysis of compatibility under
asymmetric strategy and technological conditions is still
undeveloped" and further he opines that his results are not
necessarily applicable when “one firm has a technological
advantage in the production of one of the components or a
strategic advantage in the game”. In such a case, this work
observes that although full compatibility between
components of rival systems is the eventual outcome,
firms may not have the incentive to decompose their
products into a system of components.

extremely high. Therefore, the prediction of a firm
establishing compatibility with all other firms may not
apply to this industry. In fact the business application
software industry does not exhibit many of the
characteristics assumed in the microeconomics models.

In all the above models, compatibility has been
characterized as being either fully compatible or totally
incompatible. While this may be applicable in fully
standardized industries (where a component is either
integrable or not), a majority of software applications, in
particular business software such as Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) software environments, one can observe
varying degrees of compatibility. As discussed in section
2., in this article we have characterized these industries as
standards immature. Further, in the above models, firms
have been characterized as being purely competitive and
even though the firms may produce more than one
component,
these
components
are
considered
complementary to each other. In addition, it is also
assumed that two components identical in functionality
produced by two different firms are substitutable only
functionally and not necessarily equally integrable with
components by other firms.

Another dimension of alliance formation is the social
dimension and the extended relationships that the firms
have to maintain. As Metcalfe (1994) points out earlier,
certain learning mechanisms and social relationships are
constantly created to harness innovations. This dimension
is not addressed by any of the above economic models
and even some empirical work on firm alliance behavior
(Axelrod, et al., 1995; Hagedoorn and Duysters, August
1999) does not refer to this dimension. In summation,
relationships in this industry are significantly affected by
the dynamism.

The complexity of this industry is not only due to
great component varieties but also because of the large
number of firms involved in their production. While most
of these firms do not produce the entire systems (i.e., all
components), many of them do not even produce
competing components. In other words it is possible to
find niche firms who may not have full substitutes in the
market. Furthermore presence of partial substitutes may
also introduce certain asymmetries that may affect the
even the niche player’s compatibility with everyone in the
industry. This is in spite of the fact that the niche player
by itself does not offer any substantial value to a
consumer, in the absence of certain basic components.

5. Social network approach
In order to truly represent this standards immature
market we adopt an approach derived from the sociology
literature called social network analysis. A social network
may be simply represented as a set of agents and links
between them. Sociology research has commonly utilized
such representation to study sets of individuals with links
between them representing specific social ties such as
interaction ties, friendship ties, marital ties etc. Using
network analysis it has been possible to examine the
effect of not only, the direct relationships of an individual
with other individuals but also the effect of their indirect
relationships with individuals throughout the social
network. For example, this theory has been used to
explain the formation of the Renaissance state in Florence
in relationship to the rise of certain network of family
clans (Padgett and Ansell, 1993).

4.1 Limited applicability of economic models
for a standards immature industry
Most of the economic models discussed above use
profitability as the primary criterion by which firms
decide on compatibility issues.
However, other
researchers (Hagedoorn and Duysters, August 1999) have
also pointed out that this decision may not solely rest with
short-term profitability, but there may other factors in
dynamic and immature industries. In such industries a
firm maybe more interested in capturing a larger user base
to generate a positive network externality for its current
and any future products. Most of these models predict that
firms would make their products compatible with
everybody (Economides, 1989; Matutes and Regibeau,
1988). Even assuming that there are no disincentives (in
terms of strategic alignments), the cost of achieving this
compatibility in the absence of standards would be

Research in organizational behavior has also adapted
this approach to study individual networks within
organizations. For example network theory has been used
to show that a central contact (regular employee) in a
hierarchy gets the same information available to a
manager and therefore cannot be avoided in a manager’s
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could effectively bridge any gap. In this market, these
converters, known as middleware, may become such an
acceptable component that effectively the two
components it bridges may be considered compatible.
Thus, players other than the two firms involved have
committed some intangible resources. As Podolny (1996)
states, “receiving deference eases the problem of
mobilizing resources to build, to sustain and to expand
organizations.”

negotiation with other contacts (Burt, 1992). A similar
approach can also be observed in current literature to
study industry/market level behavior where the network
represents organizations and relationships between them.
Networks have been shown to act as a resource for the
organizations (Uzzi, 1996; Uzzi, 1997; Walker, et al.,
1997). While each organization strives to maintain a
viable network of relationships (Kogut, 1991), these
networks can also capture complexity such as addition of
new entrants reshaping of existing relationships, etc.
(Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1981; Kogut, 1991;
Marsden, 1983). Market level networks can be viewed
using different dimensions of linkages, e.g. patent-citation
networks in semi-conductor industry (Podolny, et al.,
1996).

Thus, by representing a network of these business
application software providers through their alliance
formation linkages, it is possible to capture all the above
embedded social and obvious technical compatibility
decisions. The measure socio-technical capital can
therefore be used represent those organizations that enjoy
a significant clout or position in the market, i.e., a
measure of its structural position.
Researchers
(Hagedoorn and Duysters, August 1999; Podolny, et al.,
1996), to compute the structural position of actors in a
network have used a measure known as the (Bonacich,
1972). This can be used to capture the degree to which a
firm has alliances with other powerful firms in terms of
their network position. Bonacich Power identifies the
centrality of each firm as a function of the centrality of
the firms to which it is connected. A high score for a firm
is an indicator that the firm is associated with a large
number of powerful players in terms of their centrality in
the network. We have used this measure to represent
socio technical capital resulting from alliance linkages.

Researchers have used network analysis to represent
competitive positions of firms. It has been demonstrated
that the structural position of an organization within a
relevant network of relationships can be significantly
correlated to its economic performance (Podolny, et al.,
1996). In this network, the structural position of an
organization can be described by a measure called social
capital. Social capital refers to an aggregate set of
resources possessed by actors in a network by virtue of
their relationships with other actors. It is a valuable
resource for conduct of social affairs, providing their
members with “the collectively-owned capital…”
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).

5.1 Socio-technical capital
6. Results and Conclusions of a Stage I Study
While the issue of standards and technology has
partially been taken into account in some of the early
microeconomic models, there is a social dimension that
influences an organization’s product compatibilities and
hence standards adoption (Actor-network theory
(Monteiro, 1998; Monteiro, 2000). To capture explicit and
implicit dimensions of this compatibility, we introduce a
concept called socio-technical capital. Standards
literature on technology has exhaustively discussed the
effect of creating fully compatible components. In this
section, we will attempt to illustrate some of the
embedded social linkages that constrain economic choices
of firms. These embedded linkages represent commitment
to resources (human and otherwise), presence of
converters/adapters, evolution of the industry itself, etc.

In order to understand the relationship between
“socio-technical capital”, a firm’s profitability, the nature
of alliance formation, etc. we devised a two-stage study.
The first stage was to identify the formal alliances that
each ERP and specialist firms entered into with each
other. It is interesting to note that many large vendors
often charged a certain fee for a partner to enter into an
official and formal alliance. A formal alliance indicates
many levels of relationships. First, it allows a firm to
advertise its status as a partner; second, this allows
transfer of technology (prior disclosure of APIs,
protocols, etc.). Third, it also allows firms to get access
to consultants, integrators, trade fairs, etc. which allows
for the firm to establish indirect social relationships with
other players in this marketplace. In other words, a formal
alliance suggests compatibility resulting from a higher
intensity of knowledge sharing.

When a vendor makes it products compatible, it also
commits to certain resources to also maintain future
compatibility. These resources maybe result in investment
in training personnel, sharing knowledge, marketing tieups etc. Networks are also very dynamic and certain
decisions may be effected by knowledge of potential
future entrants into the market. Further, compatibility may
also occur as a result of third party firms (such as
consultants) who provide adapters and converters that

For this first stage, we collected this alliance
information from a sample of 42 business application
software firms. At the outset we identified the 10 most
popular ERP vendors from a third party, non-profit
information source. This also ensured that these were the
most dominant players in the ERP industry and therefore
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Burt, R.S. Structural holes, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1992.

can expect them to occupy a central position in the
network we would be constructing. Then we picked a
random sample of 32 firms from a list of vendors obtained
from each of the above ERP firm’s list of alliance
partners.

Davenport, T.H. "Putting the Enterprise into the
Enterprise system," Harvard Business Review (JulyAugust), 1998, pp. 121-131.

It was now feasible to construct a social network of
actors (the firms) where the linkages represented the
alliances between them. Figure 1 represents this network.
As expected the five dominant ERP vendors (in terms of
revenue and product reach) had the highest sociotechnical capital (Table I). In other words, the market
operates more like a natural oligopoly (Katz and Shapiro,
1985) where certain vendors influence compatibility
decisions (standards) as though the smaller ones did not
participate in the market. This simply implies that these
firms with the higher socio technical capital
predominantly control market compatibility issues.
Furthermore, from our network we were also able to
observe that all firms did not have an alliance with all the
ERP vendors (the natural oligopolists) or all the other
specialized firms. Thus, this gives a clear indication that
in this standards immature market where the cost of
adopting multiple standards are quite high, a firm does not
approach the market with increasing its profitability
through the generation of a higher positive externality
effect.

David, P.A. "New standards for the economics of
standardization," In Economic policy and technological
performance, P. Dasgupta and P. Stoneman (Ed.),
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge MA, 1987,
David, P.A. and Greenstein, S. "The economics of
compatibility standards: an introduction to rescent
research," Economics of innovation and new technology
(2:1), 1990, pp. 3-42.
Economides, N. "Desirability of Compatibility in the
Absence of Network Externalities," The American
Economic Review (79:5), 1989, pp. 1165-1181.
Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. "Standardization, compatibility
and innovation," Rand Journal of Economics (16:1),
1985, pp. 70-83.
Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. "Converters, Compatibility, and
the Control of Interfaces," Journal of Industrial
Economics (40:1), 1992, pp. 9-35.

The preliminary analysis serves to demonstrate the
validity of the network approach to represent standards
immature industry. However, the alliance information
obtained from the firms is an imperfect (binary) proxy for
the degree of compatibility. In the next stage of this study,
we will use some direct measure of the degree of
compatibility through various levels of technological
integrability. The data collection for this study is
currently in progress in form of interviews and
questionnaires addressed to actual implementers or
integrators. These consultant opinions can be taken to
serve as true indicators of compatibility.

Grindley, P. Standards, strategy and policy, Oxford
University Press, 1995.
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Table I

Rank Vendor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

PeopleSoft
SAP
Oracle
BaaN
Cognos
JDEdwards
Manugistics
i2
Bottomline
Vastera
Hyperion
Extricity
Taxware
McHugh

Socio-technical
Rank
capital
78.54
74.59
72.06
68.16
66.12
63.00
62.58
58.83
53.57
52.48
42.76
40.59
39.66
39.58

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Vendor
EXE
Descartes
Commerce
Agile
SSA
Numetrix
Seagate
Logility
Aspect
Synquest
Paragon
POMS
Actuate
Marcam
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Sociotechnical
capital
31.20
31.01
29.89
29.13
27.94
27.47
26.70
25.52
23.99
23.65
22.88
22.17
20.48
19.86

Rank Vendor
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Trilogy
Vantive
Glovia
Clarus
Precision
Infinium
Clarify
Siebel
Great
Symix
QAD
FRx
Mapics
Datastream

Sociotechnical
capital
18.17
18.12
17.69
17.29
17.23
15.96
15.30
13.75
13.31
12.42
11.14
9.90
2.82
2.11

